DOVERI E RESPONSABILITA' DEL TRUSTEE

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(1) «This Convention is intended to deal with an institution, the trust, which is known in certain Member States of the Conference, most often States of common law, but which is unknown in the majority of the civil law States of the Members of the Conference. In this it differs essentially from the other Hague Conventions which deal on the level of conflict of laws, of conflict of jurisdictions or recognition and enforcement of judgments, with institutions such as adoption, divorce, sales contracts or maintenance obligations governed to be sure by divergent rules of private international law in different States, but known everywhere. If certain of these Conventions sought to reconcile the countries having the nationality principle and the countries having the principle of domicile, this Convention is more particularly intended to build bridges between countries of common law and countries of civil law.» M. A. E. Von Overbeck, Explanatory Report, translation of the permanent Bureau, Bettmeralp, 1985

(2) Convenzione de L'Aja del 1 luglio 1985, Art. 2: [1] Ai fini della presente Convenzione, per trust s’intendono i rapporti giuridici istituiti da una persona, il disponente –con atto tra vivi o mortis causa- qualora dei beni siano stati posti sotto il controllo di un trustee nell’interesse di un beneficiario o per un fine determinato. [2] Il trust è caratterizzato dai seguenti elementi: (a) i beni in trust costituiscono una massa distinta e non sono parte del patrimonio del trustee; (b) i beni in trust sono intestati al trustee o ad un altro soggetto per conto del trustee; (c) il trustee è investito del potere e onerato dell’obbligo, di cui deve rendere conto, di amministrare, gestire o disporre dei beni in conformità alle disposizioni del trust e secondo le norme imposte dalla legge al trustee. [3] Il fatto che il disponente conservi alcuni diritti e facoltà o che il trustee abbia alcuni diritti in qualità di beneficiario non è necessariamente incompatibile con l’esistenza di un trust. Sul trust c.d. “amorfo”, cfr. M. Lupoi, Introduzione ai trusts, Milano, 1994; the shapeless trust, T&T, 1995, No. 3, 15, Vita not., 1995, 51.

(3) Cfr. F. Rota – G. Biasini, Il trust e gli istituti affini in Italia, Milano, 2007 ⧉ ; D. Zanchi, op. cit., p. 42. 

(4) «Whereas the trust was born to act as a means by which equity was able to control the conscience of the common law owner of property, the development of the rules considered [...] has had the effect of changing fundamentally the nature of the express trust. In short, the trust has become “institutionalised”. [...] the claims and remedies identified with equity were remarkable for their flexibility. The principles on which equity operated were considered to be more lyrical than legal. However, introducing the sort of rigid prerequisites to the creation of trusts [...] has meant that express trust has become similar to the contract: that is, a range of formalities has to be performed, and if they are performed the courts will recognise that you have created a trust.» A. Hudson, Understanding equity and trust, Abingdon, 2008, p. 28 ⧉ 

(5) Cfr. D. Zanchi, op. cit., p. 43. 

(6) «The language and organisation of the law of trusts set it apart from contract, tort, and unjust enrichment. For example, the traditional classification of trusts, as express, implied, resulting, or constructive, makes it hard to compare the creation of trusts with the creation of other legal rights and obligations. Similar problems arise when we try to compare breach of trust with other legal wrongs, such as breach of contract or tort. While the contract breaker or tort feasor may be compelled to pay damages, the defaulting trustee may be required to account or pay equitable compensation.» P. Birks – A. Pretto, Breach of Trust, Oxford, 2002, p. 2 ⧉ 

(7) M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, Trust, applicazioni nel diritto commerciale e azioni a tutela dei diritti in trust, volume II, Torino, 2007, p. 180 ⧉ 

(8) A tale proposito, sono state inserite nel testo della Convenzione apposite clausole di salvaguardia aventi ad oggetto non soltanto la tutela dell’ordine pubblico e della competenza esclusiva nazionale in materia fiscale ma anche delle norme inderogabili e delle norme di applicazione necessaria vigenti all’interno di ciascuno Stato Contraente (si pensi in particolare all’art. 15 ove è fatto riferimento alla disciplina interna in materia di tutela dei terzi in buona fede). 

(9) Cfr. C. MAK, The constitutional momentum of European contract law (II), the DCFR and the European constitutional order, Op. J., Vol. 2/2009, paper 3; Official Journal C 158, 26/06/1989 p. 0400 ; Official Journal C 205, 25/07/1994 p. 0518; The Speech by the Minister of Justice at the opening of the symposium: Towards a European Civil Code, 28 February 1997, 9.45 h. at Carlton Beach Hotel, Scheveningen, Den Haag; STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). Full Edition, Munich, 2009 ⧉

(10) Cfr. M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, II ed, Milano, 2011, p. 3 e ss. ⧉ ; M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, Trust, applicazioni nel diritto commerciale e azioni a tutela dei diritti in trust, volume I, Torino, 2007, p. 187 ⧉ ; A. Moja, Il trust nel diritto civile e tributario, Rimini, 2007 ⧉ 

(11) «The term truster has been chosen in preference to that of settlor. That term has the drawback that is no semantic connection to “trust”, only to “settlement”m and it tends rather to evoke an association with the laying out of land. Given the importance of trusts of funds of movables, such connotation is undesiderable. “Truster”, by contrast, indicates at a linguistic level more clearly that one person is entrusting (patrimony) to another.» STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), op.cit., Boox X, Ch. I, par. B ⧉ 

(12) Cfr. M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, op. cit., p. 187, vol. I ⧉ ; M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., p. 178 ⧉ ; A. Moja, op. cit., p. 39 ⧉ 

(13) «The authorities cited by the late Master of the Rolls, I think shew that as a general rule a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes in managing trust affairs all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own. There is one exception to this: a trustee must not choose investments other than those which the terms of his trust permit, though they may be such as an ordinary prudent man of business would select for his own money.» Speight v. Gaunt [1883]. 

(14) Cfr. Re Waterman’ s WT [1982] e Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co [1980]. 

(15) Trustee Act 2000, Art. 1: the trustee must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the circumstances, having regard in particular: (a) to any special knowledge or experience that he has or holds himself out as having, and (b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business or profession, to any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of a person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession. 

(16) In realtà le Corti Inglesi erano già solite valutare di volta in volta le circostanze specifiche all’interno delle fattispecie che venivano loro sottoposte al fine di riconoscere un eventuale compenso al trustee anche in mancanza di espressa disposizione da parte del settlor; la novella sembrerebbe quindi riguardare più il profilo della diligenza che quello della remunerazione. 

(17) «Segregation of trust fund. The requirement, in view of the special legal effect of the trust, for it to be clear in law which assets are subject to trust anf which are not (i.e. which belong to the private patrimony of the person who is the trustee or which are held by the trustee on the terms of a different trust) implies an initial segregation of the assets. This is part of the process of identifying the trust fund. Paragraph (2) [dell’art. X.-3:103] ensures, however, that the need for segregation does not entirely frustrate the attempt to constitute a trust where the problem of absence of segregation does not entirely frustrate the attempt to constitute a trust where the problem of absence of segregation can be resolved later by imposing in the interim a trust over the defined part of the patrimony from which the trust assets are to come» STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), op.cit., Boox X, Ch. I, par. E. ⧉ Cfr. F. Rota – G. Biasini, op. cit., p. 23 e ss ⧉ ; M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, op. cit., p. 198, vol. I ⧉ ; v. anche M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., ⧉ Capitolo IV, Applicativa dei trust interni, p. 152 e ss. 

(18) In ogni caso l’art. X.-6:103 specifica che se il bene consiste nel diritto incorporato in un documento, il dovere di salvaguardia si intende assolto con il suo affidamento ad un custode. 

(19) V. M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, op. cit., p. 194, vol. I ⧉ ; sul dovere di rendicontazione, v. in particolare M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., p. 164 e ss. ⧉ ; M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, op. cit., p. 315 e ss., vol. II ⧉ > torna al testo

(20) «The beneficiary is entitled to see all trust documents because they are trust documents and because he is a beneficiary. They are in this sense his own.» O’Rourke v. Darbishire [1920].

(21) Sul punto v. la più recente decisione del Privy Council del 27 marzo 2003 che, dopo una rassegna della passata giurisprudenza, si conclude come segue: «Their Lordships have already indicated their view that a beneficiary's right to seek disclosure of trust documents, although sometimes not inappropriately described as a proprietary right, is best approached as one aspect of the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise (and where appropriate intervene in) the administration of trusts. […] Disclosure may have to be limited and safeguards may have to be put in place. Evaluation of the claims of a beneficiary (and especially of a discretionary object) may be an important part of the balancing exercise which the court has to perform on the materials placed before it» Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Isle of Man) [2003] UKPC 26 (27 March 2003), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2003/26.html. 

(22) Cfr. M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., p. 179 e ss ⧉ 

(23) Cfr. Tribunale di Firenze, Sez. Fallimentare, 26 ottobre 2006, T&AF, 2007, 89: «il trustee non “può”, ma “deve” investire il denaro in titoli fruttiferi senza rischio per il capitale» 

(24) Trustee Act 2000, Art. 4, Standard investment criteria: (1) In exercising any power of investment, whether arising under this Part or otherwise, a trustee must have regard to the standard investment criteria. (2) A trustee must from time to time review the investments of the trust and consider whether, having regard to the standard investment criteria, they should be varied.(3) The standard investment criteria, in relation to a trust, are: (a) the suitability to the trust of investments of the same kind as any particular investment proposed to be made or retained and of that particular investment as an investment of that kind, and (b) the need for diversification of investments of the trust, in so far as is appropriate to the circumstances of the trust. 

(25) «Since the Trustee Investments Act 1961 came into force a trustee has been required by section 6(1) to have regard in the exercise of his powers of investment "to the need for diversification of investments of the trust, in so far as appropriate to the circumstances of the trust". It is common ground that a trustee with a power of investment must undertake periodic reviews of the investments held by the trust. In relation to this trust, that would have meant a review carried out at least annually, and whenever else a reappraisal of the trust portfolio was requested or was otherwise requisite.» Nestlé v. National Westminster Bank [1993]. 

(26) Cfr. Stacey v. Branch [1995]: «What is the nature of the duty imposed upon a trustee? A trustee must, of course, invest trust funds in the securities authorised by the settlement or by statute. To invest in any other securities would be of itself a breach of trust; but, even with regard to those securities which are permissible, the trustee must take such care as a reasonably cautious man would take having regard not only to the interest of those who are entitled to the income but to the interest of those who will take in the future. In exercising his discretion a trustee must act honestly and must use as much diligence as a prudent man of business would exercise in dealing with his own private affairs; in selecting an investment he must take as much care as a prudent man would take in making an investment for the benefit of persons for whom he felt morally bound to provide . Businessmen of ordinary prudence may, and frequently do, select investments which are more or less of a speculative character; but it is the duty of a trustee to confine himself not only to the class of investments which are permitted by the settlement or by statute, but to avoid all such investments of that class as are attended with hazard.» 

(27) Cfr. Ex p Lacey; Tito v Waddel (No. 2) [1977]; Coles v. Trecothick [1804]; Thomas v. Eastwood [1877]; Dougan v. MacPherson [1902]. 

(28) M. Monegat – G. Lepore – I. Valas, op. cit., p. 191, vol. I ⧉ ; M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., p. 166 e ss ⧉ 

(29) Cfr. Harris v Jenkins [1922] HCA 54; (1922) 31 CLR 341 (15 December 1922) che ha stabilito che il trustee può preservare l’efficacia del negozio compiuto dimostrando che un giusto prezzo è stato versato e che non vi è stata alcuna frode essendo: «The result of my examination of the evidence leads me to the conclusion that the agreements of April and June 1895 were brought about by the desire of the family to observe their dead father's expressed wishes, and not by any abuse on the part of the defendant of his position or by the exercise of any undue influence. It is probable, I think, that the mother recalled those wishes to the minds of the daughters and pointed out what her own position would be if the business were discontinued. The defendant was, no doubt, in a position of power; if he did not carry on the business there was no one else who could do so. But I do not think he used that power for the purpose of extorting the agreements. […] Now we are asked to say that the agreement was so unconscionable that the use and abuse of influence are apparent. Let me examine the facts. The net value of the estate was sworn for probate purposes at £2,265. Under the will each daughter was given £200 after the death of the testator's widow and one-fifth share in the residue. Under the agreements the sum of £300 was to be paid to each daughter on or before 31st December 1899; the mother's interest was unaffected, and the defendant took what was left and also shouldered the risks of carrying on the business. This does not shock the conscience, especially in view of the evidence that it is the very disposition of his estate which the testator himself wished. I am not satisfied on these facts that the brother used his position to obtain an unfair advantage over his sisters. Indeed, the plaintiff would never, I venture to think, have accused her brother of improper conduct but for the fact that her sisters obtained from him a considerable sum of money in settlement of their claims. But the attempt to repeat her sisters' success has failed, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs». 

(30) V., per esempio, lo storico caso Keech v. Sandford [1726]: «Lease of a market devised to a trustee for the benefit of an infant; lessor, before expiration of the lease, refuses to renew to the infant; trustee takes it himself, shall be obliged to convey to the infant, and account for the profits. A person being possessed of a lease of the profits of a market, devised his estate to trustee in trust for the infant; before the expiration of the term the trustee applied to the lessor for a renewal, for the benefit of the infant, which he refused, in regard that it being only of the profits of a market, there could be no distress, and must rest singly in covenant, which the infant could not do; there was clear proof of the refusal to renew for the benefit of the infant, on which the trustee gets a lease made to himself. Bill is now brought to have the lease assigned to him, and to account for the profits, on this principle, that wherever a lease is renewed by a trustee or executor, it shall be for the benefit of cestui que use; which principle was agreed on the other side; though endeavoured to be differenced, on account of the express proof of refusal to renew to the infant. Lord Chancellor. I must consider this as a trust for the infant; for I very well see, if a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust estates would be renewed to cestui que use; though I do not say there is a fraud in this case, yet he should rather have let it run out, than to have had the lease to himself. This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have the lease: but it is very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed; for it is very obvious what would be the consequence of letting trustees have the lease, on refusal to renew to cestui que use. So decreed, that the lease should be assigned to the infant, and that the trustee should be indemnified from any covenants comprised in the lease, and an account of the profits made since the renewal». V. anche Bray v. Ford [1896]; Sugden v. Crossland [1876]; Williams v. Barton [1927]; Re Macadam [1945]; Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [1942]; Boardman v. Phipps [1967]. 

(31) Cfr. M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., p. 196 e ss ⧉ 

(32) Ne deriva, nella prassi, la scelta frequente di non nominare un unico fiduciario e la diffusione di norme che impongono precisi limiti numerici. Cfr. Trustee Act 1925, artt. 34 e ss.

(33) «In Inghilterra, la sect. 30(1) del Trustee Act 1925, che sanciva il principio della responsabilità del trustee per il solo fatto proprio è stata abrogata dal Trustee Act 2000. La questione è più rilevante nella prassi inglese e internazionale che in quella italiana, dato che nella prima non è normale intestare conti correnti bancari o partecipazioni azionarie ai trustee nella loro qualità e spesso le somme del fondo in trust sono al nome di un solo trustee, spesso senza esplicitare la propria qualità. La prassi dei trust interni tende a prevenire la possibilità che un trustee agisca all’insaputa degli altri perché i beni oggetto di registrazione lo sono al nome dei trustee nella espressa qualità di trustee o perfino al nome del trust; per i conti bancari la prassi italiana richiede che essi siano o al nome del trust o al nome di tutti i trustee nella qualità, con firma congiunta» in M. Lupoi, Istituzioni del diritto dei trust e degli affidamenti fiduciari, op. cit., p. 191 ⧉

(34) X.–1:204: Plurality of trustees: (1) Where there are several trustees, the trust is solidary. (2) Where trust assets are vested in several trustees together, their co-ownership is joint. Comments. Solidary obligations. Paragraph (1) provides that if there is a plurality of trustees, the trust is solidary . This is a shorthand way of saying that the obligations of the trustees are solidary. The beneficiaries can demand performance from any of them: see III.-4:102(1). Joint ownership. Paragraph (2) makes it clear that trustees as co-owners of the trust assets hold those assets in joint ownership. Co-ownership in the form of undivided shares is ill-suited to trustees. It would be entirely counter-productive to the collective management of the trust fund by the trustees if each might alone dispose of a share in trust assets. Such an arrangement would enable trustees to act independently of the co-trustees, contrary to one of the main purposes of entrusting management of the trust fund to a body of persons. Moreover, it would result in an unwelcome fragmentation of title to the trust assets; indeed, if a third party in good faith had acquired a share in a trust assets from an errant trustee, an unwholesome sharing of assets with persons whose interests are adverse to the trust would follow. Such possibilities are precluded so long as ownership of trust assets remains joint; the trustees must act together to dispose of the trust assets. The increases security of management of the trust fund in favor of the beneficiaries, since a dishonest trustee intent on disposing of assets for personal gain requires the cooperation of his or her peers. Joint ownership also make it possible for the remaining trustee to remain owners, to the exclusion of the deceased’s heirs or representatives, if one of their number has died: see X.-8:504(1). This principle has the effect of keeping the assets vested in the persons (and only the persons) who were intended to administer the assets as the trustees . Such an arrangement is not workable with ownership in shares, where the devolution of each share on the death of its owner takes effect on its own terms and passes to the deceased’s heir or representative to the exclusion of the owners of the other share (the surviving trustees)» STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), op.cit., Book X, Ch. I, par. E ⧉ 

(35) Cfr. Civil Liability Act 1978, art. 6, Interpretation: (1) A person is liable in respect of any damage for the purposes of this Act if the person who suffered it (or anyone representing his estate or dependants) is entitled to recover compensation from him in respect of that damage (whatever the legal basis of his liability, whether tort, breach of contract, breach of trust or otherwise)..

(36) Peraltro, in Re Smith [1896] fu anche imposto ad un trustee il pagamento di un indennizzo a favore di un altro trustee per il fatto di averlo indotto con mezzi fraudolenti a commettere una breach of trust. 

(37) Art. VI.–3:201, Accountability for damage caused by employees and representatives: (1) A person who employs or similarly engages another is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage suffered by a third person when the person employed or engaged: (a) caused the damage in the course of the employment or engagement; and (b) caused the damage intentionally or negligently, or is otherwise accountable for the causation of the damage. (2) Paragraph (1) applies correspondingly to a legal person in relation to a representative causing damage in the course of their engagement. A representative is a person who is authorised to effect juridical acts on behalf of the legal person by its constitution. 

(38) «Optional party. A Trust auxiliary is an entirely optional feature of a trust: the trust terms will determine whether there is any person who has power to appoint or remove trustee or to agree a trustee’s resignation. Terminology. It has proved useful to formulate a shorthand term to denote a person who has power to appoint or remove a trustee or to agree to a trustee’s resignation, since this notion is recurrent in the provisions concerned with changes in trusteeship. The term trust auxiliary has been chosen because the presence of a trust auxiliary is an optional feature of a trust constitued by a juridical act; the insistution is essentially to assist the smooth operation of the trust infrastructure, rather than being concerned with the administration or disposal of the trust fund directly. One or more powers.The trust terms may confer on a trust auxiliary all of the powers referred to in the Article or only some of them. Different persons may be given power to appoint trustees and to remove them, though this may be unwise since it will produce problems in practice if the trust auxiliary entitled to remove a trustee has an opposite view of the appropriateness of a trustee appointed by a different trust auxiliary. Scope of powers. The scope of powers will be determined by the trust terms.» STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), op.cit., Book X, Ch. I, par. E ⧉ 

(39) «Other Parties. Trust Enforcers. Since this Book does not give effect to trusts for abstract purpose which are not of public benefit (on the terms that the trustee can be made to perform), it has not been necessary to provide for trust enforcers. The person entitled to enforce the trust is either the beneficiary (who enforces out of self-interest) or, in the case of trusts for public benefit purposes, a public officer or body (enforcing out of a public duty) or a sufficiently interested person (again enforcing out of interest): see X.-1:205. The rules do not contain a special regime recognising other trusts to be enforced by persons nominated under the trust terms for that purpose because there is otherwise no person with a sufficient duty or interest in their enforcement. Trust protectors. Equally, the rule do not provide for trust protectors at least in so far as their role goes beyond that of mere trust auxiliary. Such persons may be regarded as monitors for trustees interposed between the trustees and beneficiaries. Their function is to act as a control or brake in relation to the trustee since critical powers of the trustees cannot be exercised without his consent. Typically the protector will be a family friend or a close and trusted legal adviser. As an institution the trust protector suffers from the defect that, like enforcers of trust of purposes which are not of public benefit, the protectors’ interest in acting or their extrinsic duty to act may be contrived or confined. In any case the inclusion of such an institution would have taken these rules into the furthest reaches of the trust model and beyond anything which might realistically be contemplated as European trust law model. Third parties. The position of third parties in relation to the trust, be creditors of a party to a trust or an acquirer of trust property or some other person coming into contact within the scope of private law with a trust, is regulated by Chapter 10» STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE/RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GROUP), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), op.cit., Book X, Ch. I, par. G ⧉ > torna al testo

 (40) «Injunctions divide between those that require some action from the respondent (mandatory injunctions), those that require the respondent to refrain from some action (prohibitory injunctions) and those that seek to prevent some action that it is feared may be performed in the future (injunctions quia timet). Another division between types of injunction is between interim injunctions, which are made during litigation to preserve the parties’ respective positions until the litigation is resolved, and final or permanent injunctions, which are made at the end of litigation as part of the court’s resolution of the dispute between the parties» A. Hudson, op. cit., p. 199 ⧉ 

(41) «The equitable remedies considered here are injunctions, specific performance, account, rescission, rectification and subrogation. As considered in earlier chapters, principally Chapter 7, the trusts imposed ny equity are institutional and not remedial. That means that that trusts arise automatically without the exercise of the court’s discretion. The matters considered in this chapter are remedial and therefore do grant the court some discretion as to the nature and extent of the remedy, in line with established principles» A. Hudson, op. cit., p. 198. 

(42) A. Hudson, op. cit., p. 161 ⧉ 

(43) Cfr. Box v. Barclays Bank [1998]: «equitable tracing is only avialable where there is an equity to trace which requires that there must be an initial fiduciary relationship between the person claiming to trace and the party who is said to have misapplied that person’s money.» 

(44) Cfr. Trustee Act 1925, Art. 61, Power to relieve trustee from personal liability: If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether appointed by the court or otherwise, is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust, whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before or after the commencement of this Act, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same. 

(45) Cfr. art. X.–7:201: (1) A trustee is liable to reinstate the trust fund in respect of loss caused to the trust fund by non-performance of any obligation under, or arising out of, the trust, if the non-performance: (a) is not excused; and (b) results from the trustee’s failure to exercise the required care and skill. (2) However, a person is liable under paragraph (1) only if that person knew, or it was manifest, that that person was a trustee. [...]. 

(46) Cfr. Trustee Act 1925, Art. 62, Power to make beneficiary indemnify for breach of trust: (1) Where a trustee commits a breach of trust at the instigation or request or with the consent in writing of a beneficiary, the court may, if it thinks fit, make such order as to the court seems just, for impounding all or any part of the interest of the beneficiary in the trust estate by way of indemnity to the trustee or persons claiming through him. (2)This section applies to breaches of trust committed as well before as after the commencement of this Act. 

(47) In Armitage v. Nurse del 1999, per esempio, si è dibattuto intorno ad una disposizione del settlor per cui il trustee non avrebbe risposto di alcuna perdita o danno arrecato al trust found, senza limitazioni di tempo o di causa, a meno che la lesione non fosse derivata da un suo comportamento doloso: la Corte affermò che una così ampia exemption clause opera liberando il trustee da ogni responsabilità entro i limiti del comportamento disonesto e che la negligenza del trustee non costituiva nella fattispecie motivo di responsabilità anche se del tutto evidente e grossolana. 

(48) «Sussiste la responsabilità del trustee per breach of trust quando egli, pur sapendo di violare le disposizioni del trust, ha agito ugualmente perché credeva in buona fede di compiere un’azione a favore dei beneficiari. Un trustee che agisca al fine di favorire persone che egli sa non essere beneficiarie del trust non si può avvalere di alcuna clausola di esclusione della responsabilità, anche quando il suo comportamento non danneggi i beneficiari. Il trustee può essere tenuto responsabile per “dishonesty” solo se i beneficiari provano: a) che egli non credeva “genuinamente” che la sua condotta fosse nell’interesse economico dei beneficiari del trust; ovvero b) che, se egli così credeva, che ciò fosse talmente irragionevole che nessun trustee con le qualificazioni professionali del trustee in questione (un avvocato) vi avrebbe realmente creduto.» Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 19 luglio 2000, Walker and others v. Stones and others, in T&AF, ottobre 2001, pp. 600-612.